Introduction 1
There has been a long-standing debate on corporate governance in mature market economies.
2 Recently issues of corporate governance have also come to the fore in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Improving corporate governance has been singled out as one of two priorities in the recent memorandum of understanding between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Russian government. Deficiencies of corporate governance have also been blamed for the recent balance-of-payments crisis in the Czech Republic, where disappointing growth in labour productivity despite relatively high investment rates, together with excessive wage increases and the lack of attractiveness of the Prague stock market for foreign investors, led to an overvaluation of the exchange rate and an unsustainable current account deficit.
However the debate on corporate governance has been largely inconclusive. In what follows we will argue that there are complementarity and possibly substitutability relationships between certain governance instruments. These relationships have profound implications for understanding how individual corporate governance instruments work, how they interact within a corporate governance system, and for informing the debate about reforming them.
The first section below surveys the existing literature, while the second section offers an interpretation of efficient corporate governance as a system of complementary elements. An important result of the theory is that policies aimed at changing only a subset of relevant parameters and instruments may be ineffective or even counterproductive because they fail to solve systemic inconsistencies and may even add to them. Inter alia, this can explain why systems might differ quite widely in performance even though they may look quite similar along some lines of governance. The third section offers an application to corporate governance problems in the Czech Republic. The conceptual framework of the second section is used to identify where economic policy created inconsistencies or failed to remove them, and suggests reforms that would be consistent with the governance instruments already in place. A fourth section concludes the chapter.
Corporate governance: the debate
The need to govern agency relationships in firms arises from the separation of ownership and control. This separation is motivated by a discrepancy in the firm between promising investment projects and internally generated investible funds. If the problem of corporate governance is not solved satisfactorily, outside finance will remain limited. Hence the efficient allocation of capital crucially depends on efficient corporate governance. Moreover it has recently been argued that there is a positive causal relationship between the degree of financial development and economic growth in emerging markets.
3 This implies that, by improving financial systems, and hence corporate governance, countries can grow faster.
The problem of corporate governance is solved in any given firm by using a menu of governance instruments. A non-exhaustive list includes incentive pay (Kole, 1997), monitoring and intervention by boards of directors (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990) , monitoring and intervention by shareholders (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990) , the market for corporate control with the attendant takeover threat (Grossman and Hart, 1980) , debt and the attendant bankruptcy threat (Jensen, 1986) , monitoring by debtors (Hoshi et al., 1990) , monitoring by regulators and financial market analysts (Holmström and Tirole, 1993) , the market for managers (Fama, 1980) and product market competition (Nickell, 1996) .
Typically one governance instrument is singled out and it is shown how its existence in the real world can be rationalized as a solution to agency problems between management and the owners of capital. Empirical investigations have sought to establish links between the performance of firms and the presence of certain governance instruments.
4
The literature is mostly silent about the presence or absence of governance instruments other than the ones under study.
5 Given that in reality all firms are using a menu of instruments, two interpretations
